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Abstract  
The aim of the paper is to investigate the effects of the corporate governance model on social and 
environmental disclosure. We analyze the disclosures of the 100 U.S. Best Corporate Citizens in 
the period 2005-2007, and we posit a series of simultaneous relationships between different 
attributes of the governance system and a multi-dimensional construct of corporate social 
performance (CSP). We consider both the extent and the quality of social and environmental 
disclosure (SED), with the purpose of identifying increasing levels of corporate commitment to 
disclosure and shedding some light on whether SED is used as a signal or rather as a legitimacy 
tool. 
Our empirical evidence shows that the stakeholders’ orientation of corporate governance is 
positively associated with CSP and SED. On the other hand, we do not find support for the 
monitoring intensity of corporate governance being negatively associated with social 
performance.  We also find that CSP in the “product” dimension is positively associated with the 
extent and quality of SED whilst CSP in the “people” dimension is negatively associated with the 
extent and quality of SED. 
At a time when shareholders and stakeholders share more common aspects in their relationships 
with firms, this is a significant area to explore and this research fills an important lacuna in this 
respect. 
 
Keywords: corporate governance, corporate social responsibility, social and environmental 
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Introduction 
International organizations (OECD, 2004 and 2010; Global Corporate Governance Forum, 2009) 
and institutional investors (such as Aviva, Hermes, CalPERS) are asking companies to incorporate 
social and environmental responsibilities in their core decision making processes, based mainly on 
the argument that incorporation of these “new” dimensions will lead to long term value (i.e. the 
business case argument). They argue that, especially after the recent global financial crisis, 
corporate boards of directors should provide well-informed strategic direction and engaged 
oversight beyond short-term financial performance. By so doing, companies would more 
comprehensively address risks by anticipating actions with a potentially adverse impact on society 
and the environment and thus better manage reputational risks whilst also potentially identifying 
new business opportunities.  
Such vision calls for new responsibilities of boards collectively and directors individually both in 
terms of corporate activities and accountability. This impetus on a new understanding of the role 
of boards can be found in a growing number of global and industry specific initiatives such as the 
OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and the UN Global Compact. The OECD Principles 
call on businesses to recognize and safeguard stakeholders’ rights, including legitimate interests 
and information needs. These Principles call on boards to be truly accountable to shareowners and 
to take ultimate responsibility for their firm’s adherence to a high standard of corporate behavior 
and ethics. This call is in line with academic research on boards' contribution to corporate strategy 
(e.g. Pugliese et al. 2007) and with the claim that adequate board composition, structure and 
internal processes are necessary to promote an effective contribution of the board of directors to 
strategy (Minichilli, Zattoni and Zona, 2009). Although the academic literature has widely 
investigated the determinants of social and environmental strategy and disclosure (Johnson and 
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Greening, 1999; Luoma and Goodstein, 1999; Gray et al., 1995; Cho and Patten, 2007; Clarkson 
et al. 2008; Cho et al., 2010), little research effort has been made to analyze how the board of 
directors might affect accountability policies (e.g. Haniffa and Cooke, 2005; Michelon and 
Parbonetti, 2010).  
Drawing on a wide range of studies on the determinants of social and environmental disclosure 
(SED), the aim of this paper is to investigate whether a corporate governance path leading to 
social and environmental disclosure can be traced, by considering the interplays between different 
governance attributes and corporate social performance (CSP). In order to do so, we analyze the 
disclosures of the 100 U.S. Best Corporate Citizens in the period 2005-2007 and we posit a series 
of simultaneous relationships between different attributes of the governance system and a multi-
dimensional construct of corporate social performance.  
First, we develop holistic measures of both monitoring intensity and stakeholders’ orientation of 
corporate governance. Then, we test whether these two attributes of the corporate governance 
system affect simultaneously the two dimensions of social performance (people and product). 
Finally, by considering both the extent and the quality of social and environmental disclosure 
(with the purpose of identifying increasing levels of corporate commitment to stakeholders) we 
are able to shed some light on whether SED is used to signal their superior performance or rather 
as a legitimacy tool to cover up poor performance. By considering simultaneously the extent and 
the quality of SED we are able to detect whether a poorly performing company is providing more 
extensive information on CSP, than its good performing peer, but of lower quality i.e. no 
quantitative or financial data (Guidry and Patten, 2010). 
The research has important implications in a number of areas.  Firstly it merges together three 
strands of the literature: governance, CSP and SED, showing that a more holistic approach can 
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lead to a more complete interpretation of complex phenomena; secondly it gives new insights into 
the different roles that the governance system might play in both socially responsible practices 
and disclosure; and thirdly it develops and explores a ‘governance path’ for social and 
environmental disclosure.  At a time when shareholders and stakeholders share more common 
aspects in their relationships with firms, this is a significant area to explore and this research fills 
an important lacuna in this respect. By trying to disentangle the complex governance path to 
social and environmental disclosure, we are providing international organizations and institutional 
investors with a better view of how governance can affect the setting of social and environmental 
objectives and enhance accountability in relation to the performance of these objectives. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the literature and 
develops the research hypotheses. The research method section presents the sample, measures and 
methodology. The results are then presented and discussed. The conclusion section gives an 
overview of the empirical findings and draws the main contributions and implications of this 
study. 
 
Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses 
Governance and CSP 
The board of directors is traditionally assigned with two important roles: the monitoring (control 
role) and the advising (service role) (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Although they are 
contemporaneous roles played by the board, how these two functions relate to CSP have only 
been studied separately.  
The monitoring function has been mainly analyzed following agency theory (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983), according to which internal and external governance 
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mechanisms are set with the objective of monitoring management’s behavior on behalf of 
shareholders, given the potential for conflicts of interest arising with the separation of ownership 
and control (Berle and Means, 1932). Following this perspective, there are several characteristics 
of the governance model that enhance the monitoring intensity, for example within the board of 
directors, considered the most important internal governance mechanism (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976), we can identify the presence of independent directors and the separation between the CEO 
and the Chairman as enhancements. The literature (e.g. Gillan, 2006) also discusses the 
monitoring role played by ownership structure, in terms of both the ownership concentration and 
the presence of institutional investors1. 
Within this theoretical framework, Cespa and Cestone (2007) and Surroca and Tribò (2008) argue 
that CSR is used by management as an entrenchment strategy, in order to gather support from 
stakeholders. Following this line of reasoning, incumbent managers and stakeholders would be 
natural allies because collaboration with stakeholders cannot easily be blocked by individual 
shareholders, if based only on a ‘suspicious’ entrenchment strategy. This stimulates managers’ 
incentives to improve CSP with entrenchment intentions (Cespa and Cestone, 2007). 
Nevertheless, the monitoring intensity of the governance model adopted by the firm should also 
constrain managerial discretion. This would hinder the implementation of expensive socially 
responsible activities. That is, the monitoring function of the board and ownership is expected to 
have a negative direct effect on a firm’s CSP.  At the empirical level, Coffey and Wang (1998) 
find evidence of the managerial control thesis, and suggest that “a substantial component of 
charitable giving can be ultimately traced to instrumental motives” (p. 1601). Similarly, Surroca 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 A discussion of how these characteristics are linked to monitoring intensity is beyond the scope of this paper. For a 
review of the literature on various monitoring mechanisms, please refer to Gillan (2006). Moreover, the ability of 
these separate characteristics to proxy for the monitoring intensity of the governance structure is an empirical issue 
and it will be addressed using a latent variable in the empirical model later in the paper. 
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and Tribò (2008) find that variables measuring the monitoring intensity of the governance model 
(such as the proportion of independent directors, the separation between the CEO and the 
Chairman and the presence of independent committees) are negatively associated with CSP. 
Therefore in line with agency theory, we posit the following hypothesis: 
H1:  The monitoring intensity of corporate governance is negatively associated with social 
performance 
The focus on the advising role of the board is the perspective adopted in the resource dependence 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Hillman et al., 2000) and stakeholders’ research (Johnson and 
Greening, 1999; Luoma and Goodstein, 1999; Hillman et al., 2001; Huse, 2003).  
Within this approach, besides monitoring capabilities, directors sitting on the board bring critical 
resources to the company in terms of knowledge, ties and legitimacy. Since companies might have 
incentives to design governance structures aimed at satisfying the interests of critical stakeholders 
(Zattoni, 2011), the level of stakeholder orientation of the firm’s governance is coherent with a 
model of extended corporate social responsibility in which those who run the firm are responsible 
for fulfilling their fiduciary duties towards all stakeholders (Sacconi, 2006). Within this line of 
reasoning, resource dependence theory will help us in defining what characteristics of the 
governance structure might be indicative of an orientation towards stakeholders of the firm, 
because the resources brought by the directors will be for the firm’s use to implement stakeholder 
oriented strategies. This idea is linked to the work of Zahra and Pearce, (1989: 297), according to 
which corporate boards act as ‘boundary spanners’ and perform many roles at the same time, 
providing four types of benefits to the firm: advice and counseling (Mintzberg, 1983); legitimacy 
(Selznick, 1949); channels for communicating information between external organizations and the 
company (Hillman et al., 2000) and preferential access to commitments or support from important 
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stakeholders in the company’s environment (Hillman et al., 2001). Thus, directors may do more 
than reduce uncertainty (Hillman et al., 2000), as they bring resources and legitimacy to the 
company (Gales and Kesener, 1994). Zattoni (2011:268) argues that “a board representing 
stakeholders’ groups that provide critical contributions has higher decision-making abilities and 
can achieve a cooperative bargaining agreement among all constituents”. Within this framework, 
the reputation of the directors in the community and among stakeholders enables the company to 
carry on its business and actions (Zattoni, 2011), mobilize external support and resources, and 
enhance organizational legitimacy (Provan, 1980; Deephouse, 2000) and thus lead to increased 
social performance (Mallin and Michelon, 2011).  
A service role with respect to stakeholders is also ascribed to the ownership of companies. 
Johnson and Greening (1999) posit the existence of a positive relationship between the level of 
pension funds’ ownership and social performance, mainly relying on the fact that pension funds’ 
managers “are not subject to the same short-term pressures as investment managers and they 
therefore have longer time horizons” (p. 567) which allows for a greater compatibility between an 
institutional owner’s time horizon and the time needed to realize the benefits of investment in CSP 
(Johnson and Greening, 1999; Graves and Waddock, 1994). Similar arguments are used by Cox et 
al. (2004) who find that long term institutional ownership appears to discriminate between 
corporate social performance attributes favouring employees related CSP rather than community 
and the environment and that they are more likely to apply negative screens for selecting 
companies on the basis of CSP, so the worst performers are excluded from the investment 
decisions of long-term institutional investors. Subsequently, Neubaum and Zahra (2006) find that 
the volume of long-term pension fund holdings is positively associated with CSP and that, 
although “activism itself is not associated with CSP in a significant way, its interaction with long-
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term institutional holdings is significantly and positively associated with CSP” (p. 125). Their 
empirical evidence thus suggests that the presence and salience of institutional long-term 
ownership might promote corporate support for engaging in socially responsible activities. This is 
in line with the arguments of Zattoni (2011) who argues that the assignment of ownership rights to 
stakeholders supplying critical contributions could affect the value creation process of the firm. 
Along this line of reasoning, we posit that both the board of directors and the ownership structure 
of the company play a role in addressing corporate stakeholders’ orientation. Thus, we develop 
the following hypothesis: 
H2: The stakeholder orientation of corporate governance is positively associated with social 
performance 
 
CSP and SED 
Many studies investigated this relationship, with different underlying theoretical frameworks, 
predictions and results (Bowman Haire, 1975; Abbott Monsen, 1979; Freedman Jaggi, 1982; 
Ullmann, 1985; Belkaoui Karpik, 1989; Roberts, 1992; Patten, 2002; Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2003; 
Cho and Patten, 2007; Clarkson et al., 2008; Cho et al., 2010).  
Socio-political theories of social and environmental disclosure (see, e.g. Guthrie & Parker, 1990; 
Patten, 1991; 1992; Lindblom, 1994; Gray, Kouhy, & Lavers, 1995; Hackston & Milne, 1996; 
Cho et al., 2006) suggest that the extent of this disclosure is a “function of exposure to public 
pressure in the social/political environment” (Patten, 2002, p. 763). In other words, according to 
this approach, the worst performers would be expected to provide greater disclosure and thus a 
negative relationship between disclosure and performance should be posited.  Similar arguments 
are brought up by litigation cost theory, as “if greater disclosure provides information that may be 
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used in litigation against the disclosing firm (presumably by third parties with political or social 
agendas), good environmental performers might elect to minimize such disclosure” (Al Tuwaijri 
et al., 2003). Based on the discussion above, we offer the following directional hypothesis: 
H3: Corporate social performance is negatively associated with the extent of social and 
environmental disclosure  
In line with agency theory, when a company engages in socially responsible activities, which most 
likely involve the use of resources, it may be interpreted as a way to create an image of sensitivity 
to important influences, which do not belong to the market, but that can still be in the long-term 
interests of shareholders (Abbott Monsen, 1979; Freeman, 1984). Assuming managers are willing 
to reveal their social engagement to both stakeholders and shareholders, one way to communicate 
it is through some form of social and environmental disclosure (Belkaoui and Karpik 1989), as 
good social and environmental performance should reduce the company’s exposure to future risks 
and thus this information should be perceived as good news by investors. In this sense, companies 
may use SED to signal their commitment to external stakeholders (i.e. SED is used as a “signal”). 
Al Tuwaijri et al. (2003) find that good environmental performers disclose more environmental 
information than do poor performers in line with the prediction of Verrecchia’s (1983) 
discretionary disclosure model. In a similar vein, Clarkson et al. (2008) find that “superior 
environmental performers are more forthcoming in truly discretionary disclosure channels, as 
predicted by the economics based voluntary disclosure theory” (p. 305). If agency theory 
predictions hold true, we expect that a higher quality of SED, which are supposedly more 
credible, will be provided by the best performers in order to signal their true type and real 
commitment to CSR. Therefore we develop the following hypothesis: 
H4: Corporate social performance is positively associated with the quality of social and 
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environmental disclosure  
 
A governance path for social and environmental disclosure? 
While each of the relationships analyzed above has received considerable attention, we have much 
to learn about the joint impact of corporate governance and corporate social performance on social 
and environmental disclosure (Haniffa and Cooke, 2005; Michelon and Parbonetti, 2010), 
especially considering that studies focusing on social performance and disclosure have brought up 
mixed evidence. Thus, based on the previous literature review, we expect that the interplay 
between the characteristics of the corporate governance model adopted by the company and 
corporate social performance (Mallin and Michelon, 2011) is a fundamental determinant of 
companies’ disclosures.   
Bondy et al. (2008) investigate whether the adoption of codes, including corporate governance 
codes, by firms is associated with the firms’ CSR practices.  They find that “codes are not 
primarily used as governance tools for CSR commitments but are used as governance tools for 
other issues such as those requiring compliance” (p. 295).  Furthermore they state ”it would in fact 
appear that codes are more often used as tools for governing traditional business issues such as 
ensuring compliance with laws and regulations, improving the corporation’s reputation, and 
guiding employees in terms of expected workplace behavior” (p.302). However Buckholtz et al. 
(2008) place more emphasis on the role of corporate governance, for example, they state “Boards 
are responsible for more than monitoring the CEO’s behavior – they must share in the leadership 
of the firm to insure that the firm fulfills its economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary social 
responsibility to the firm” (p.340). Therefore we develop a model that aims at disentangling the 
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complex path to SED. Figure 1 presents a model of the hypothesized antecedents of social and 
environmental disclosure.  
   INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
The model depicts the governance system as two latent concepts: they are the monitoring intensity 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and stakeholders’ orientation (Ullman, 1985) of the governance 
model. Following Johnson and Greening (1999), we believe CSP is a multidimensional concept 
and thus using an overall (aggregated) measure of social performance may mask the individual 
dimensions that are equally important and relevant. They argue that there are at least two 
conceptually distinct dimensions: people (relating to the contributions firms make to communities, 
employees and society in general) and product (relating to product and service quality and 
responsibility and to the firm’s stance toward the natural environment – environmentally 
conscious products). We follow their line of reasoning and we adopt the constructs identified by 
Johnson and Greening (1999). The model takes into consideration two latent variables depicting 
social (people) and environmental (product) performance.  Thus there are four sets of hypotheses: 
two of the sets hypothesize a relationship between the latent governance variables and the latent 
CSP variables, whilst two of the sets relate this path to quantity and quality of information. Our 
four hypotheses are therefore split up into four pairs of links (H1a, H1b; H2a, H2b; H3a, H3b; 
H4a, H4b). 
The signs we expect are summarized in Table 1. Following the entrenchment literature based on 
agency theory, more monitoring intensity of corporate governance should be associated with less 
CSR activities and thus lower CSP, whilst a more stakeholder oriented governance should 
improve CSP. If the legitimacy argument pursued in the accounting literature holds true, then 
more disclosure should be provided by the worst performers as a legitimacy strategy, but if the 
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agency theory predictions also hold true, then we expect that higher quality disclosure, which 
supposedly is more credible, should be provided by the best performers who want to signal their 
true commitment, indicating that disclosure is used as an accountability mechanism.  
     INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Research method 
Sample 
The initial sample for this study consists of the 100 companies listed in the Business Ethics 100 
Best Corporate Citizens for the years 2005, 2006 and 2007. The rank is built on the KLD overall 
social performance rating obtained as the average of the ratings in seven corporate social 
performance areas: Community, Corporate Governance, Diversity, Employee Relations, 
Environment, Human Rights, and Product Quality and Safety2.  
The choice of this sample is driven by the findings of Cox et al. (2004), according to which long-
term institutional investors select, through exclusion, the worst social performers. Thus, by 
considering companies in the list of Best Corporate Citizens, we are able to identify whether the 
presence of institutional investors is in fact able to lead to better social performance. 
Given that some companies were listed for more than one year in succession whilst others were 
listed for only one year and that we lost some observations because of lack of data, the total 
number of observations is 221 and the total number of companies is 135. For each company and 
year, archival data about ownership, board composition and CSR performance are collected as 
follows.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Whilst belonging to the list of the Best Corporate Citizens, these companies present both strengths and weaknesses 
as the ratings present both positive and negative values. Thus KLD’s social performance data of the Top 100 Best 
Corporate Citizens provides a great degree of variability in the behaviour of the firms. Moreover by using a period of 
three years (2005, 2006, and 2007) we are able to analyse the company’s longer-term social performance. 
Nonetheless, we recognise that the generalisation of the findings of the study may be limited given the fact that the 
sample consisted of the most highly rated companies. 
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Measures of social and environmental disclosure 
The extent of SED is determined using the content analysis method, a line of research widely 
adopted to ensure reliability and valid inferences from narrative data in accordance with their 
context (Krippendorff, 2004). Following coding, quantitative scales are derived to permit further 
analysis. This method has been widely adopted in previous social responsibility disclosure studies 
(see, e.g. Hackston and Milne, 1996). 
We measure social and environmental disclosure in two ways in order to depict different 
disclosure choices made by companies, that we argue depict an increasing level of commitment to 
communication.  
First, we employ a measure of disclosure which, we believe, allows us to test the adoption of a 
multi-stakeholder reporting framework that forces companies to report according to the triple 
bottom line (economic, social and environmental) and requires managers to analyze all 
stakeholders’ expectations and to discuss the positive or negative replies provided by the 
company’s operations and performances. The reporting framework for the content analysis refers 
to the GRI standards: we verify how many indicators (out of a maximum of 121) of those 
suggested by the GRI the company reports on. A particular sentence is chosen as the recording 
unit to overcome problems related to the use of words or portions of pages that add unreliability. 
Thus, each sentence is matched with all 121 sustainability disclosure items and is coded as 
follows: with a score of 0 if it provides no information; with a score of 1 if it discloses 
information.  The level of disclosure is measured by counting the presence of items. The content 
analysis is performed using the annual social, environmental and sustainability reports of the 
companies. Our proxy for the extent of disclosure is obtained as the adherence to the GRI 
standards, i.e. by dividing the total number of items by the maximum possible (121). This measure 
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ranges from 0 (no GRI indicators are reported) to 1 (all GRI indicators are reported). This measure 
was collected for all companies issuing a sustainability report, even when they do not explicitly 
declare that they adhere to the GRI guidelines. If a company does not have a sustainability stand-
alone report this measure is set equal to zero. 
Second, we employ a measure for the quality of disclosure. Following the coding scheme 
proposed by Guidry and Patten (2010) we perform content analysis as described above but we 
code disclosures including quantitative or financial information as three points, disclosures with 
company-specific information in a non-quantitative form as two points, and items disclosed in 
only general form as one point. Our quality of disclosure index is the standardized measure (it 
ranges from 0 to 1) calculated by dividing its disclosure score by the maximum score obtained in 
each year, across all firms. 
Monitoring intensity 
In line with previous literature (e.g. Gillan, 2006), we employ various measures (related to 
ownership structure and board of directors composition) to capture the monitoring intensity of the 
governance model. Data on ownership is obtained courtesy of Thomson Financial. Following 
Roberts (1992), we measure ownership concentration as the percentage of shares held by investors 
holding more than 5%. We also consider the role played by large institutional investors by 
considering the percentage of shares held by investment management funds (Johnson and 
Greening, 1999).  
Data on board composition are collected from the firms’ annual reports and proxy statements. For 
each company it was possible to find the name and the type of directors (i.e. executive or 
independent non-executive director), a description of their role within the board (i.e. membership 
in a committee) and, in general, a brief biography. We measure board independence by the 
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proportion of independent directors. The presence of CEO duality is measured by a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the board and 0 otherwise. 
Stakeholders orientation 
In line with the predictions of resource dependence theory, we consider various measures to 
capture the stakeholders’ orientation of the governance model. We consider the presence and 
power of active institutional shareholders with a dummy variable (pension) equal to 1 if a pension 
fund is among top 10 investors (Johnson and Greening, 1999; McGuire et al. 2003). In line with 
Sur et al. (2008), we also consider ownership diversity measured as the variance of the percentage 
of shares held by different types of investors. We measure the stakeholders’ orientation of the 
board with several proxies. Board composition is measured by the proportion of community 
influentials. Community influentials are classified following Hillman et al. (2000): academicians, 
politicians (including retired politicians), military officers (including retired military officers) and 
members or directors of social/nonprofit organizations (including members of clergy and religious 
leaders). Community influentials are identified using the brief biographical note that is reported in 
the proxy statement. According to Coffey and Wang (1998), board diversity is defined as 
variation among its members3. We measure board diversity as the proportion of women sitting on 
the board. The strategic posture of the company has been proxied by previous literature (Cowen et 
al., 1987; Roberts, 1992; Trotman and Bradley, 1981) by referring to the board structure. We thus 
employ a dummy variable equal to 1 if the company has identified a director in charge of social 
responsibility issues or when boards have a committee in charge of CSR/ethics/sustainability 
matters, 0 otherwise. In order to measure relational capital, following Koenig and Gogel (1981), 
we use the average number of directorships held by non-executive directors.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Although diversity is a rich concept and would include gender, race, age, possible disabilities, etc., given the 
operational difficulties in proxying for such multiple aspects of diversity, we will rely only on the presence of women 
on the board, i.e. gender diversity, in line with (Coffey and Fryxell, 1991). 
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Measures of corporate social performance 
Data on corporate social performance are collected from the KLD’s SOCRATES database, which 
is a comprehensive research database measuring the social performance of corporations. The web-
based database4 contains social and environmental ratings indicators on the Business Ethics 100 
Best Corporate Citizens for the years 2005, 2006, and 2007.  
Companies are rated in seven corporate social performance areas: Community, Corporate 
Governance, Diversity, Employee Relations, Environment, Human Rights, and Product Quality 
and Safety. For each area, KLD analysts assign ‘strengths’ and ‘concerns’ on a 5-point scale. Each 
area score is then determined by subtracting the concerns scores from the strengths scores. Data 
are collected in a disciplined process from a wide variety of company, government, and non-
government organizations and media sources. Once the information is collected, KLD rates the 
social performance of companies using a proprietary framework of positive and negative 
indicators. 
KLD data have been extensively used in the management literature on corporate social and 
environmental performance (see, e.g., Waddock and Graves, 1997; Johnson and Greening, 1999; 
Hillman et al., 2001; David et al., 2007) as well as recent social and environmental accounting 
research (see, e.g., Cho et al., 2006; Cho and Patten, 2007; Cho et al., 2010).  
Following Johnson and Greening (1999), we hypothesize two factors on the basis of the difference 
components of the KLD database. The first factor is labeled as “people dimension” (community, 
employee relations and human rights) and the second is labeled “product dimension” 
(environment, product). To adjust for possible industry effects we subtract the industry average 
for each of the five dimensions in the KLD databases from the individual scores for each 
dimension.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 http://www.business-ethics.com/BE100_all 
16	  
	  
Table 2 summarizes the measurement of variables. 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Method 
We use structural equation modelling (SEM) to identify relationships between our variables (see 
Bollen 1989 for a comprehensive treatment on this topic). SEM is used to describe the directed 
dependencies among a set of variables, i.e., a multi-equation regression model in which the 
response variable in one regression equation may appear as a predictor in another equation. Some 
of the variables may be not observable (latent factors) and affected by measurement errors. In a 
nutshell, SEM exploits the causal relationship among variables that is typical for the path analysis, 
in which latent structures, commonly defined in the factor analysis are also considered. In 
particular latent variables are related to observables in the so called measurement model whereas 
the structural equation model is a regression that defines the causal relation among the latent 
variables. Assuming the relations are linear and Gaussian distribution, inference can be performed 
through maximum likelihood. In this paper we used the SEM package implemented by Fox (2006) 
for the R language (R development core team 2005). Furthermore, to deal with binary variables in 
the SEM setup, we computed heterogeneous correlation matrices among ordinal and numerical 
variables. 
Figure 2 shows the hypothesized relations among the different proxies employed in our study. We 
control for firm’s size, profitability and industry effects. 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
In particular, the variables in rectangles are observed whereas variables in the ellipses are latent. 
Furthermore, the one directional arrow indicates causal relation between variables, i.e., the 
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regression coefficient, and bidirectional arrows indicate correlation. As usual in this literature, all 
the variables considered are characterized by measurement error. 
Results  
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Analysis 
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics and correlation analysis for all variables of the companies 
in the sample.  
On average, only 30.9% of our companies issue a sustainability report (untabulated). 
Approximately 20% of the companies adopt the GRI standards. Companies issuing a 
sustainability report disclose information of only about 12% (measure 1 in Table 3) of the 
indicators proposed by GRI, although the maximum is 119 out of 121. Given that we are 
analyzing Best Corporate Citizens, these results are quite surprising, as we would have expected a 
greater number of companies engaging in sustainability reporting. This first evidence goes in the 
direction predicted by socio-political theories of social and environmental disclosure, which 
argues that worst performers would be more likely to use SED as a legitimacy tool. 
On average, companies present a higher average of CSP along both the KLD community 
dimension (measure 3 in Table 3: the mean is 1.225, and the maximum is almost 5.0) and 
employee relations (measure 4 in Table 3: the mean is 1.112, and the maximum is 4.66). Major 
concerns can be identified in issues regarding human rights (measure 5: the mean is 0.145, and the 
minimum is -4.29) and product quality and safety (measure 7: the mean is 0.541, and the 
minimum is -1.89). From the standard deviation data, we can also say that there seems to be great 
variation among companies in the sample about how they deal with the different CSR areas. The 
community and environmental issues present the largest variance. On the other hand, human 
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rights and product quality and safety issues seem to be more uniformly managed (albeit at a lower 
level) by companies in the sample.  
During the three year period, on average large investors (measure 8) own 16% of the shares. This 
highlights a degree of ownership concentration for the companies in the sample. Most of the 
shareholding is held by investment management companies (measure 9) (69.4%). With regards to 
board variables, the mean proportion of independent directors (measure 10) is 78.8%, CEO 
duality is quite a common practice given that during the three years on average 65.9% of 
companies have a CEO who is also the Chairman of the board of directors (measure 11). The 
mean proportion of community influentials (measure 14) is equal to 24.3%, indicating that almost 
1 in every 4 directors is a community influential. Women directors (measure 15) represent on 
average 15% of board members. Only in one case is the board made up of a majority of women 
directors (Student Loan Corporation in 2006). In 59.9% of cases, the companies have a CSR or 
Ethics Committee. On average, non-executives have 3.15 directorships in other companies  
(measure 17). 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
From the Pearson correlations for the variables used in our analysis, several statistically 
significant correlations emerge.  
Ownership concentration appears to be significantly and negatively correlated with the level of 
adherence to GRI (our measure for extent of disclosure) and the quality disclosure score. No 
significant correlations are found between the proportion of shares held by investment institutions 
and measures of disclosure. The presence of pensions funds is positively correlated both with the 
adoption of the GRI standards and disclosure quality. We also find evidence of significant 
correlations between board variables and measures of disclosure. The proportion of community 
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influentials is significantly and positively correlated to all the measures of disclosure, while no 
significant associations are found between the proportion of women directors and disclosure. The 
average number of directorships is positively related to the extent of disclosure. 
The community and environmental performance are significantly associated with all our measures 
of disclosure and the sign of the correlation coefficient is positive, suggesting that amongst the 
Best Corporate Citizens, the best performers are those more likely to present the greater number 
of disclosures and disclosures of higher quality. Employee relations performance is significantly 
associated only with the extent of disclosure, while human rights performance is negatively 
related to the disclosure measures. 
Structural Equation Model 
The results of the structural model are presented in Figure 3. The goodness of fit indexes of the 
structural model support the fit between the structural model and the data, thus it suggests validity 
of the model.  
There are many goodness-of-fit indicators for SEM models. Here we focus on the Bentler 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI), the Normed Fit Index (NFI) and the Root Mean Square Error of 
Approximation (RMSEA) that have been proved to be the most reliable in empirical research.  
In particular, CFI compares the covariance matrix predicted by the model to the observed 
covariance matrix, and compares the null model (in which a null covariance matrix is assumed) 
with the observed covariance matrix. For our model, CFI = 0.91, and, as a rule of thumb, this 
indicator should be equal to or greater than .90 to accept the model, indicating that 90% of the 
covariation in the data can be reproduced by the given system. Similarly to the CFI index, the NFI 
compares the uncorrelated model with the given one. Here, we obtain the NFI equal to 0.92 that 
suggests an acceptable fit of the model. Finally, we consider RMSEA which is probably the most 
20	  
	  
popular goodness-of-fit indicator used in empirical analysis.  This indicator is in spirit different 
with respect to CFI and NFI since it is not based on the comparison between the given and a 
baseline model, but it is just based on the Chi Square of the model. Practitioners suggest that an 
RMSEA smaller than 0.06 suggests a good model fit. Concluding, all the indicators used affirm 
the adequate ability of the model to describe the dependencies among variables. 
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
The path estimates are significant with some interesting evidence that we present below. We 
discuss and provide an interpretation of these results in the last section.  
Firstly, all the coefficients linking observed and measurable governance variables to the latent 
ones are significant at 5% or more. The monitoring intensity is mainly driven by the presence of 
investment managers (the coefficient is equal to 0.748 at the 1% level) and the proportion of 
independent directors (the coefficient is equal to 0.120 at the 1% level), while the magnitude of 
the coefficients for CEO duality (0.027) and ownership concentration (0.016) indicate that these 
variables only marginally impact the monitoring intensity of corporate governance. The 
stakeholders orientation of corporate governance seems to be highly determined by the links with 
the environment (the coefficient is equal to 0.908 at the 1% significance level). Although the 
magnitude of the coefficients for the presence of a CSR committee (0.143) and pension funds 
(0.101) is lower, they still provide support for a role of these two attributes in positively 
enhancing the stakeholders’ orientation of corporate governance. On the other hand, the 
magnitude of the coefficients for ownership diversity (-0.003), the proportion of community 
influentials (0.099) and the proportion of women directors (0.038) indicates a much lower 
influence on the stakeholders’ orientation of corporate governance. The results also provide 
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evidence of a low covariance between the monitoring intensity and stakeholders’ orientation of 
corporate governance (the coefficient is equal to 0.015, at the 10% level).  
Regarding the CSP latent variables, we obtain evidence that the performance in community and 
employee relations affects the people dimension, but the performance in human rights does not 
(the coefficient is not statistically significant). Also, the CSP in product dimension is mainly 
determined by environmental performance (statistical significance at 1% level), while the product 
quality performance negatively affects it (statistical significance at the 10% level). We also find 
evidence of a positive covariance between these two CSP variables. 
With regard to the sign and values of the coefficients of interest, we have evidence that both 
governance attributes (monitoring intensity and stakeholders orientation) positively affect social 
performance (people and product), contrary to the prediction of agency theory that stronger 
monitoring would be associated with lower CSP. Nevertheless, the values and statistical 
significance of the two sets of coefficients vary. The coefficient linking monitoring intensity of 
corporate governance and people (product) performance is equal to 0.085 (0.017) at the 10% 
significance level, while the coefficient linking the stakeholders’ orientation latent variable to 
people (product) is equal to 12.383 (2.382) at the 5% level or higher. Taken together, these results 
provide support for H2 but not for H1.  
Finally, Figure 3 also shows the two sets of coefficients linking social performance and social and 
environmental disclosure. We find that CSP in the product dimension is positively associated with 
the extent (0.872 at the 1% significance level) and quality (0.762 at the 1% significance level) of 
SED. Moreover, the analysis also shows evidence of a significant relationship between CSP in the 
people dimension. Interestingly enough, the coefficient linking CSP in people performance to the 
extent (quality) of disclosure is negative and equal to -0.163 (-0.142) at the 1% significance level. 
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Whilst these results would support H3, because CSP in the people dimension is negatively related 
to the extent of disclosure and for H4, because CSP in the product dimension is positively related 
to the quality of disclosure, at the same time – unexpectedly - they also falsify them.  
We will discuss some interpretation of these results in the following section. 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
 The purpose of this study is to shed light on how corporate governance affects social and 
environmental disclosure. In order to do so, we analyze the disclosures of the 100 U.S. Best 
Corporate Citizens in the period 2005-2007 and we posit a series of simultaneous relationships 
between different attributes of the governance system and a multi-dimensional construct of 
corporate social performance. We consider both the extent and the quality of social and 
environmental disclosure, with the purpose of identifying increasing levels of corporate 
commitment to disclosure and shedding some light on whether SED is used as a signal or rather as 
a legitimacy tool.  
We find that the estimated coefficients linking both governance attributes to social performance 
are both positive, contrary to the prediction of agency theory that stronger monitoring would be 
associated with lower CSP. If we look at the magnitude of these coefficients compared to those 
linking the stakeholder orientation of corporate governance to CSP we notice that the intensity of 
this effect is much greater, in support of the enhanced stakeholder orientation hypothesis. This 
evidence is also in line with stakeholders’ oriented governance being a substantive rather than a 
symbolic practice (Rodrigue et al., 2011). Substantive stakeholders oriented governance does 
bring organizational changes and therefore leads to improved social performance, whereas 
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symbolic governance would only portray an image of commitment with no real impact on 
business operations. Therefore we have support for H2 but not for H1.  
Our results seem to suggest that, contrary to what we would expect from agency theory, the 
monitoring mechanisms of corporate governance have a positive effect on the likelihood that 
companies commit to CSR and improve their performance. There are two possible explanations 
for this result. First, given that our observed monitoring variables are thought to limit managerial 
opportunism and protect shareholders’ interests, in the case of the Best Corporate Citizens, 
improving CSR performance may indeed be in line with these goals. Second, it could also be that 
some of our monitoring proxies are indeed capturing not just the monitoring role of governance 
but also a reputation role. Previous literature argues, for example, that the presence of independent 
directors on the board increases the board’s objectivity and its ability to represent multiple points 
of view of the firm’s role in the environment and among stakeholders (Haniffa and Cooke, 2005). 
Moreover, Johnson and Greening (1999) find empirical support for their hypothesis that outside 
directors’ representation is positively associated with corporate social performance. The 
theoretical argument behind these findings is that, by being more dedicated to stakeholders’ 
expectations, independent directors will increase their own prestige and role in society and thus 
they would be more likely to encourage the company to undertake CSR activities. If independent 
directors are likely to respect the stakeholder obligations of the firm, they are more likely 
committed to stakeholder responsibility because in this way they increase the prestige and role in 
society (Zahra and Stanton, 1988; Haniffa and Cooke, 2005). Similar arguments are made with 
regard to CEO duality by organization theory, which claims that a strong leadership might be 
linked to legitimacy enhancement as it is signaling a clear direction to stakeholders.  
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With regards to our second set of hypotheses, interestingly enough, when we relate overall SED 
disclosure to performance on the “people” dimension, both coefficients are negative, suggesting 
that as performance in the people dimension increases, companies are more to likely provide both 
less and lower quality information, supporting the idea that disclosure is used as a legitimacy tool 
for poor social performance. This finding partially supports H3 but not H4. On the other hand, 
when we relate overall SED disclosure to the product dimension, these coefficients are positive 
suggesting that firms performing well in the product dimension used disclosure as a way to signal 
their superior performance, both by providing a greater extent of information and information of 
better quality. With reference to the product dimension therefore we have support for H4 but not 
H3.   
Overall, our evidence suggests that while SED is used as a signal to communicate superior 
performance in the “product” dimension to external stakeholders, it is also used as a legitimacy 
tool when companies are performing poorly in the “people” dimension. An interpretation of these 
unexpected results might be linked to the different levels of societal concern with environmental 
versus social issues, which might shape the relationship between disclosure and underlying 
performance.  
The “product” dimension includes corporate environmental performance, for which there is more 
publicly available data (for example the Toxic Release Inventory, the Environmental Protection 
Agency, etc.) and measures are more objective (greenhouse gas emissions, waste recycled, etc.). 
Because of this greater objective and standardized measurability of environmental issues, this type 
of disclosure is relatively easier to verify.  Moreover, as companies face greater societal pressure 
with regard to environmental issues, this seems to push companies to present greater and better 
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disclosure, in order to manage stakeholders’ scrutiny. This suggests the use of disclosure to signal 
the superior social performance of the company and as an accountability mechanism.  
On the other side, the “people” dimension is characterized by more uncertainty and fuzziness both 
in terms of which issues are to be considered important and which measure better depicts the 
performance of firms. This means that although stakeholders’ pressure might be high, the 
reliability of the disclosures made by firms is also harder to discuss and evaluate. Thus, in the 
context of the “people” dimension, companies are more likely to use disclosure as legitimacy 
rather than as an accountability mechanism. 
Our findings have implications for both directors of companies and the companies’ stakeholders. 
There is a new emphasis on the role of boards of directors in setting social and environmental 
objectives which meet the evolving expectations of a firm’s stakeholders.  Our study highlights 
the impact that different aspects of corporate governance might have and, in turn, the ways in 
which a board’s actions in relation to CSP may affect accountability policies. 
We believe that our study contributes to the governance literature by showing that the corporate 
governance path leading to social and environmental disclosure can be traced, but it is indeed a 
complex rather than a straightforward route.  However by considering the interplays between 
different governance attributes and corporate social performance (CSP), and using structural 
equation modelling techniques, we have shed some light on this important area.  We believe our 
research is timely and helps fill a significant lacuna in the literature as it provides important 
insights to corporate boards, shareholders, stakeholders and regulators who all have an increasing 
interest in this area. 
Like all studies, ours is not without its limitations. First, our sample is the Best Corporate Citizens 
who may be more disposed towards improving CSR performance (although companies generally 
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do seem to be placing more emphasis on CSR aspects). Secondly, we only focus on a single 
country and institutional setting. Therefore further research could focus on an international 
comparison to show whether the legal, cultural and institutional environments affect this complex 
set of relationships.  
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Figure 2. Hypothesized relationships between the proxies 
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Figure 3. Empirical findings 
Goodness-of-fit index = 0.97    Bentler CFI = 0.91 
Adjusted goodness-of-fit index = 0.91  * 10% significance level, ** 5% significance level, *** 1% significance level 
RMSEA index = 0.05 
Bentler-Bonnett NFI = 0. 92  
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Table 1. Hypotheses 
Hypotheses Description of paths Hypothesized sign 
1a Monitoring governance à people dimension - 
1b Monitoring governance à product dimension - 
2a Service governance à people dimension + 
2b Service governance à product dimension + 
3a People dimension à extent of disclosure - 
3b People dimension à quality of disclosure + 
4a Product dimension à extent of disclosure - 
4b Product dimension à quality of disclosure + 
 
 
Table 2. Measurement of variables 
 Model Variables Description 
Monitoring Governance   
Ownership concentration % of shares held by major investors (above5%) 
Investment managers % of shares held by investment management funds 
Board independence Proportion of independents sitting on the board 
CEO duality CEO duality (dummy=1 if CEO is also Chairman, 0 otherwise) 
Stakeholder Governance  
Pension funds Dummy = 1 if a pension fund is among top 10 investors, 0 otherwise 
Ownership diversity Variance of % shares held by different type of investors 
Community influential Proportion of community influentials sitting on the board 
Women directors Proportion of women sitting on the board 
CSR committee Dummy =1 if there is CSR committee or Director in charge of CSR, 0 otherwise 
Links with environment Average no. of directorships of non-executive directors 
Social Performance:  People dimension 
Community performance KLD dimension for community performance 
Employee relations KLD dimension for employee relations performance 
Human rights KLD dimension for human rights performance 
 Product quality dimension 
Environmental performance KLD dimension for environmental performance 
Product responsibility KLD dimension for product responsibility performance 
Social and environmental disclosure variables 
Extent of disclosure % indicators as proposed by GRI 
Quality of disclosure Content analysis quality score 
Control variables 
Firm size Log of total sales 
Firm profitability Return on equity 
Table 3.  Descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients 
 Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 0.119 0.221 1                
2 0.097 209 0.447** 1               
3 1.225 1.396 0.342** 0.339** 1              
4 1.112 1.125 0.140* 0.108 -0.033 1             
5 0.145 0.855 -0.171* -0.181** 0.014 -0.132* 1            
6 1.030 1.183 0.3161* 0.290** 0.11 0.056 -0.245** 1           
7 0.541 0.771 -0.016 0.035 -0.127 0.122 -0.049 -0.030 1          
8 0.164 0.152 -0.176** -0.168* -0.077 -0.011 0.023 -0.012 0.0796 1         
9 0.694 0.211 0.007 0.013 0.004 0.01 0.012 -0.045 -0.0076 0.363** 1        
1
10 0.788 0.100 0.073 0.065 0.033 0.123 -0.097 0.114 -0.033 0.026 0.09 1       
11 0.659 0.475 -0.073 -0.078 -0.009 -0.081 0.078 -0.122 -0.0301 -0.043 0.047 0.142* 1      
12 0.166 0.373 0.112* 0.168*** 0.009 0.066 0.069 0.005 0.078 -0.162** -0.046 -0.220** -0.061 1     
13 0.185 0.014 -0.143* -0.143* -0.209** -0.038 0.011 -0.074 -0.0032 -0.03 0.068 0.007 0.051 0.126* 1    
14 0.243 0.184 0.177** 0.168* 0.210** 0.07 -0.041 0.193** -0.219** -0.076 0.095 0.190** -0.037 0.033 -0.035 1   
15 0.154 0.105 0.107 0.103 0.195** 0.029 0.122 0.0117 -0.151* 0.082 0.031 0.033 0.174** 0.020 -0.140* 0.227** 1  
16 0.599 0.491 0.05 0.008 0.205** 0.03 -0.025 0.0665 -0.086 -0.022 -0.081 0.012 0.038 -0.039 -0.011 -0.061 0.169* 1 
17 3.154 1.427 0.149* 0.119 0.175** 0.071 0.036 0.0831 -0.145* -0.137* 0.032 0.138* 0.102 -0.007 -0.12 0.383** 0.181** 0.267* 
 
1. Extent of disclosure: % indicators as proposed by GRI 
2. Quality of disclosure: content analysis quality score 
3. Community performance: KLD dimension for community performance 
4. Employee relations: KLD dimension for employee relations 
performance 
5. Human rights: KLD dimension for human rights performance 
6. Environmental performance: KLD dimension for environmental 
performance 
7. Product responsibility: KLD dimension for product responsibility 
performance 
8. Ownership concentration: % of shares held by major investors 
(above5%) 
9. Investment managers: % of shares held by investment management 
funds 
10. Independent directors: proportion of independents sitting on the board 
 
 
11. CEO duality: dummy=1 if CEO is also Chairman, 0 otherwise 
12. Pension funds: dummy = 1 if a pension fund is among top 10 investors, 
0 otherwise 
13. Ownership diversity: variance of % shares held by different type of 
investors 
14. Community influential: proportion of community influentials sitting on 
the board 
15. Women directors: proportion of women sitting on the board 
16. CSR committee: dummy =1 if there is CSR committee or Director in 
charge of CSR, 0 otherwise 
17. Links with environment: average no. of directorships of non-executive 
directors 
* 10% significance level, ** 5% significance level, *** 1% significance level 
 
